characteristics indicate varying degrees of interest in an advertiser's offer. For example, consider an advertiser selling motorcycles. The advertiser could attempt to reach consumers in particular demographic groups (say, males age 18 to 25), site browsing (reading a motorcycle enthusiast web site), or search terms (searching for "motorcycle deals"). The advertiser's forecast of the likelihood of the user making a purchase would inform the advertiser's willingness to pay to present its offer to that consumer.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of an online publisher, operating a web site or other online resource, advertising is typically an ancillary component to be integrated with, or at least juxtaposed against, a larger offering. If a publisher offers a search function, the publisher could show text ads related to users' search requests. Alternatively, a publisher could place "banner ads" (typically graphical images in industry-standard sizes) adjacent to articles on its site. In principle a publisher could even make individual words on its site into ads leading to advertisers' sites-though with questions about who selects which words link where, and whether and how consumers know they're clicking on ads. A publisher's resource is typically space on its site or service. If the advertiser's site presents too many ads, consumers may reach an unfavorable view of the site.
Online advertising can be measured and sold along any of several metrics. An advertiser could pay a fee each time its ad is shown-a "cost per impression" placement, often known as CPM ("cost per mille" being the price for 1,000 impressions). Alternatively, an advertiser could pay when its ad is clicked-"cost per click" (CPC). Or an advertiser could pay only when a user clicks and subsequently makes a purchase-"cost per action" (CPA). An advertiser could even offer payment proportional to the amount of the user's purchase, ad valorem, or differing payment scales could apply to the advertiser's various products. In expectation, advertisers and publishers might be indifferent among these payment metrics; with a known click rate, conversion rate, or order size, an advertiser and publisher could agree to use any of these metrics, and fees would be equal in expectation. That said, the metrics have importantly different implications for parties' incentives, moral hazard, and fraud, as discussed in subsequent sections.
Industry norms associate certain payment metrics with certain advertising formats. Historically, display advertisements were typically priced per impression-a natural approach from the perspective of a publisher who does not know which ads will attract many clicks, and who wants to be able to predict site revenues. That said, selling ads per impression influences participants' behavior: A CPM advertiser wants to attract as many click as possible, even from customers who may ultimately be minimally interested in the advertiser's offer; perhaps some of those marginal customers can be convinced to buy the advertiser's product. CPM advertisers thus have a clear incentive to present banners with overstated claims of relevance of urgency, like those shown in the inset at right. Facing this onslaught of low-value ads, consumers seem to develop "banner blindness": As of 2009, practitioners at iMedia Connection report that for every 1,000 display ads shown to consumers, just 0.2 to 0.3 are clicked. (Stern 2010) Meanwhile, some display ad services have begun to price ads differently-selling ad placements on a per-click basis, encouraging advertisers to design offers that consumers choose to activate.
[Insert deceptive banner exemplars about here] Ads on search engines typically follow a CPC model-not charging advertisers for their ads to be shown, but charging substantial fees when a user clicks an ad (for some keywords, as much as $20 or more per click). With CPC pricing, an advertiser seeks to attract only customers reasonably likely to purchase its product or otherwise offer the advertiser some benefit; attracting clicks from uninterested customers means unnecessary marketing expense. On the most favorable view, CPC pricing also invites users to click ads: Knowing that an advertiser was willing to pay to reach users searching for a given keyword, a user may expect that the advertiser's offer will match to the user's request. Indeed, as Overture (later acquired by Yahoo) began offering pay-per-click ads, founder Bill Gross specifically boasted of the benefits of "us[ing] money as a filter" of which sites to show in search listings. (Hansell 2001) Affiliate link systems typically follow a conversion-contingent CPA payment model-either paying a publisher only when a user signs up (e.g. a $15 commission for referring a customer to Netflix), or in proportion to the dollar value of the user's purchase (e.g. a 6% commission on the user's purchase from Amazon). To date, few affiliate marketing programs have been willing to pay affiliates for impressions or clicks-seemingly on the view that little-known affiliates, without meaningful vetting or supervision, would have an overwhelming tendency to fake impressions and/or clicks, whereas actual sales are viewed as harder to fake. That said, as detailed in Advertising Fraud below, even conversionbased payment methods suffer strategic behavior that inflates advertisers' costs. show that the resulting instability led to an inefficient allocation of placements-often misordering advertisers, putting a lower-value advertiser above one who valued clicks more highly, and thereby destroying surplus. The resulting instability also reduced total revenue of the mechanism by at least 7% (a conservative bound reflecting the difficulty of estimating advertisers' valuations from historic bid data).
In 2002, Google began to use a mechanism with some characteristics of a second-price auction.
Rather than paying its own bid, an advertiser would pay an amount linked to the bid of the next-highest advertiser-reducing the incentive to adjust bids continuously. Moreover, Google adjusted each bid by the estimated likelihood of a user clicking the corresponding ad, thereby selecting the ad with largest expected revenue to Google.
Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) (EOS) study this multi-unit second-price mechanism,
calling it "generalized second price" or "GSP." EOS shows that GSP has no dominant-strategy equilibrium, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium. However, the corresponding generalized English auction has a unique equilibrium, and that equilibrium is an ex post equilibrium with bidders' strategies independent of their beliefs about others' types. Moreover, Cary et al. (2007) show that a reasonable myopic bidding strategy converges to the equilibrium identified in EOS. Further overviews of sponsored search appear in Feldman et al. (2008) , Lahaie et al. (2007) , Liu et al. (2008) and Yao and Mela (2009) .
Ad platforms continue to use reserve prices to rule out bids they view as undesirably low. In simulations, Edelman and Schwarz (2010) assess the revenue consequences of an optimally-chosen reserve price. Which bidders face the largest cost increases from a rising reserve price? Edelman and Schwarz show that, for all advertisers who do not drop out as reserve price increases, the increased reserve price yields an identical dollar-for-dollar increase in total payment.
Most ad platforms offer additional targeting of their ads based on at least the user's geographic region ("geotargeting") and day/time ("dayparting"). These targeting functions are typically operated on a binary basis: Either a user request matches the restrictions, and hence is eligible to show the advertiser's ad, or the advertiser specifies that its ad may not be shown. Microsoft adCenter offers further supplemental targeting based on user self-reports of age and gender at other Microsoft properties (such as Hotmail, MSN, and Windows Live). If a user matches the demographic characteristics an advertiser specifies, the advertiser may opt to increase its bid, potentially increasing its ranking relative to competitors. Thus, in adCenter, an advertiser's bid is not just a price, keyword, and vector of match conditions, but also additional price adjustments paired with demographic conditions. Despite the additional targeting possible under demographic bid adjustment, uptake of demographic targeting seems to be limited so far.
Transparency of Pricing and Ranking
Ad platforms limit the information available to advertisers, relative to the early list of all advertisers and bids that Overture initially provided. For example, Google has never shown advertisers the bids or identities of competing bidders. Instead, Google provides advertisers a traffic estimator tool:
An advertiser enters a possible bid, and Google reports the estimated number of clicks it would provide per day as well as the advertiser's estimated average position in ad listings.
Ranking of advertisers sometimes raises concerns about favoritism or penalties-concerns that tend to focus on Google, given that company's large market share (discussed further in "Multihoming,
Competition…" below). Google states that it ranks advertisers according to both their bids and Google's various assessments of site characteristics. (Varian 2009 ) If one site enjoys a more favorable assessment, it can obtain a more prominent placement at considerably lower expense. On one view, a search engine is a private party entitled to show whatever links it sees fit, in whatever order and prominence it chooses. But some advertisers allege that Google singles out up-and-coming competitors for particularly unfavorable treatment, typically by demanding unreasonably large prices in order to show ads from those would-be competitors.
TradeComet styles itself as a vertical search engine, specifically a potential way for businesses to find the suppliers they require and a potential competitor to Google to the extent that companies use 
Ad Networks and Syndication
Advertisers typically prefer to buy online advertising in large blocks from known partners, so intermediaries organize multiple sites into networks. By helping advertisers buy placements on small to mid-sized sites, networks help fund such sites-fueling the diversity of web content. Furthermore, networks reduce transaction costs by aggregating many small sites into a single line item that an advertiser can buy with a single contract and a single payment.
1 Google was sued for deceptive advertisements, namely ads for "free" ringtones that actually carried substantial monthly charges. However, Google presented a successful defense grounded in the Communications Decency Act §230, which prohibits treating the provider of an interactive computer service (here, Google) as the publisher of information provided by an independent entity (here, the advertiser who submitted the deceptive ad 
Information Disclosure in Ad Networks
Ad networks present a clear question of disclosure of lists of participating sites. When buying online ad placements, advertisers naturally want to know where their ads appear. Some ad networks provide lists of their member sites. But most networks see a strategic downside in providing advertisers with site lists: With a site list, an advertiser could bypass the network-contacting member sites and negotiating direct placements that deny the network compensation for its effort in suggesting the placement. Citing this concern, many networks use a "blind" information structure-selling placements on a bundle of sites, without telling advertisers which sites are included.
It is unclear whether the risk of bypass merits keeping network site lists confidential. For large advertisers running ads on just a few sites, bypassing a network might offer financial benefits sufficient to justify the effort. But such bypasses would require sacrificing networks' serving, tracking, contracting, and payment functions, which would require considerable effort to replace. Moreover, if networks' sole concern is bypass, they have other tools at their disposal. For example, affiliate network LinkShare requires that an advertiser commit not to run any affiliate marketing activities through competing networks, while affiliate network Commission Junction prohibits an advertiser from bypassing the network for any relationship initially brokered by the network.
An alternative explanation for blind networks comes from member sites that advertisers would not approve, if an advertiser's approval were requested. By keeping its member list confidential, a network can avoid advertiser scrutiny of its sites-thereby letting the network include sites of mixed desirability.
Pricing in Ad Networks
When a network bundles placements on multiple web sites, billed to advertisers without itemization as among included sites, a network must allocate payments within the network. 
Intermediary Counts and the Prospect of Disintermediation
Early intuition on online markets anticipated disintermediation-that online markets would let contracting parties eliminate brokers and middle-men. (Bambury 1998 ) But disintermediation has not been the dominant outcome in online advertising, especially not in display advertising. Rather, a drop in transaction costs makes it easier and more common to build lengthy relationships not often seen in other contexts. For example, an advertiser's ad might pass through half a dozen brokers en route to a publisher's site-each taking a cut as small as a few percent, such that even these complex relationships may leave adequate surplus to the ultimate buyer and seller. On the other hand, lengthy relationships reduce accountability when an ad ends up misplaced (e.g. Edelman 2007), while also slowing ad-load times and sometimes yielding lost impressions or error messages.
Measurement, Mismeasurement, and Fraud

Measuring the Value of an Ad Placement
To optimize ad spending, advertisers typically seek to assess the value of an advertisement placement-then buy more of the placements that seem to offer the largest value relative to cost.
Simple as it sounds, such measurement often proves difficult. In principle, advertisers can measure the ratio of impressions or clicks to sales, including the gross profit from such sales, thereby calculating the benefit attributable to a given placement. But this measurement calls for an online sales process-a poor fit for those selling through offline channels. Offline sellers can attempt to collect data on ad effectiveness by collecting leads online, e.g. asking would-be car-buyers to submit their contact information for referral to a local dealer. But customers often decline to submit such leads, adding bias or requiring ad hoc manual adjustments.
Most measurement assumes that, without an advertising expenditure, subsequent sales would not have occurred. For example, if a user clicks an ad and then makes a purchase, a typical measurement concludes that the ad "caused" the purchase-asserting that, without the ad, the purchase would not have occurred; and asserting that other advertising efforts did nothing to cause the sale. This assumption tends to reduce the apparent value of display ads, which often offer delayed benefits to advertisers. For example, a user might see an ad on a news site, then begin to consider a possible future purchase of the advertised product. (Fowler 2007) This assumption similarly discounts the value of offline advertising (TV, print, billboard, etc.), which is also hard to tie to specific purchases.
Conversely, this assumption tends to increase the apparent value of search ads, which often immediately precede a purchase. For example, a user looking to buy a laptop might search for "laptop"
or even "Thinkpad x300 laptop" right before completing the purchase. Yet the user running such a search might well buy the specified laptop even if no ad were presented. Thus, from the perspective of the advertiser, the relevant comparison may be "pay for the ad and sell the product" versus "don't pay for the ad, yet still sell the product." In that context, paying for the ad may be a poor value. Yet most measurement systems nonetheless assume that online advertising directly and solely causes subsequent purchases.
Moreover, all manner of spyware, adware, typosquatting sites, and other interlopers can claim to have referred customers who actually requested a merchant specifically and by name, as detailed in the subsequent section.
Advertising Fraud
Delivered purely electronically, through computer systems without in-person checks or well- Incentives, both between firms and within firms, sometimes dull efforts to uncover advertising fraud. Most large advertisers buy online ads through agencies which are paid on a commission basis.
Catching fraud would reduce the measured spending and hence reduce the agency's commissionrequiring an investment of time and effort yielding lower payment to the agency. Networks' incentives are also attenuated: In the long run, advertisers will distrust networks with a reputation for fraud. But in the short run, networks can increase revenue by retaining unsavory placements that increase volume.
Furthermore, within-firm incentives invite advertisers' staff to ignore or tolerate fraud. For many online advertising buyers, the prestige of a position comes in part from the size of the budget under management-limiting the incentive to exclude fraudulent spending which would reduce budgets. Furthermore, some buyers face leveraged incentives that sharply discourage clean-up. For example, some companies pay their affiliate managers based on year-over-year growth of the programs they operate. Ejecting fraud would cut spending and yield a disproportionate drop in compensation.
Finally, where a fraud has successfully defrauded a buyer, that person may hesitate to come forward, on the view that admitting the problem would reveal a personal failure. In a forthcoming draft, Edelman attempts to measure some of these effects based on variation in staff and network compensation schemes.
Ad Placement Arbitrage
Industry participants often use the term "arbitrage" to describe buying ad placements from a low-cost source, then showing ads through a network that offers higher payments. If both placements are equally desirable, such arbitrage might equalize prices across markets, improving efficiency and increasing surplus. But if a seller offers lower prices because its placements suffer lower quality, resale of these resources to a high-paying buyer practice does not constitute "arbitrage" as economists use the term. Rather, such resale is more likely to constitute misrepresentation of a low-quality resource as a high-quality resource. (Edelman 2005) Multihoming, Competition, and Barriers 58% of search advertisers use only Google, not Yahoo or Microsoft adCenter. (Ashlagi et al. 2010 ) This is arguably puzzling because, from an advertiser's perspective, competing search ad services seem to be at least orthogonal if not complementary: Some users favor one search engine, while others use another, and an advertiser who foregoes a top ad platform fails to reach those users who rely on the corresponding search engine. Prices cannot explain this puzzle because Google has both the most advertisers and the highest prices. (Edelman 2009b) Instead, it seems advertisers distinctively favor Google because, despite Google's higher prices, Google offers access to more users and to a larger volume of searches. Ashlagi (2010) shows that the advertisers that use all of Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft are significantly larger than the advertisers that use just one or two of these platforms. Ashlagi attributes this difference to transaction costs: That advertisers using multiple platforms face extra costs, including signup costs, copying and updating ads, monitoring performance, and adjusting bids.
In principle, advertisers could use automated software systems to copy their campaigns from one ad platform to another-avoiding most costs of transferring and updating ads. Each ad platform provides an application programming interface (API) to let advertisers and tool-makers update and check ads and bids. That said, Google's API contract limits how advertisers may use this APIprohibiting tools that copy ads from one platform to another. Edelman (2008) argues that these restrictions are an improper barrier to advertisers seeking to use smaller ad platforms.
Consumer Protection: Disclosures and Deception
Online advertising raises all manner of consumer protection issues. For one, must advertisements be labeled as such? The FTC has called for "clear and conspicuous disclosures" that listings are advertisements, particularly in contexts such as search advertising, where users may reasonably fail to recognize advertisements as such. Through late 2010, most search engines used terms like "sponsored links" to label their advertisements. In an online experiment, Edelman and Gilchrist (2010) show that the more detailed label "paid advertisement" reduces users' clicks on ads by 25% to 33%, with drops particularly pronounced for users for with low income, low education, and little online experience. Meanwhile, Edelman (2010) critiques Google's newest advertisement label, "Ads", pointing out that the new label is so tiny that it substantially fits within an "o" of Google, among other shortfalls.
Some pay-per-click advertisements seek to deceive or defraud users -for example, promising "free ringtones" when in fact the service carries a substantial charge. Edelman (2006c) Google not responsible for deceptive ads it sold and and presented to users -even when Google charged for each advertisement, was aware of the untrue statements, and even encouraged the deception through, e.g., a "keyword suggestion tool" that suggested describing ringtones as "free." This decision reflects an interpretation of the Communications Decency Act §230, which instructs that a web site must not "be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by" anyone else.
Open Questions
The contracts, institutions, and norms of online advertising continue to evolve. Innovation continues even on questions as fundamental as when an advertiser pays-with new payment metrics based on "view-throughs" (a CPM-CPA hybrid requiring an impression followed by a conversion) and "impressions per connection" (a CPM-CPC hybrid charging advertisers for impressions, but providing bonus impressions if click-throughs are sufficiently frequent). These metrics alter incentives for advertisers and publishers, addressing some of the problems with standard approaches but simultaneously creating new concerns. With so much in flux, there remains ample opportunity to identify new metrics that better satisfy participants' requirements.
Meanwhile, Google's market share continues to grow-exceeding 90% of search volume in scores of countries. Does Google's auction mechanism fully determine prices? Or can Google use its increasing popularity to increase prices to advertisers and otherwise enjoy its market power?
The structure of online advertising markets is closely linked to issues of general public concern.
For example, despite the rise of online advertising, newspapers receive significantly less revenue for readers reached online rather than in print. But newspapers serve important public functions, so online advertising shortfalls prompts a need to revisit the future of journalism. Funding newspapers through online ads is particularly challenging because it is often unclear what ads are most suitable: What advertiser seeks a placement adjacent to news of war, election, or natural disaster? Some ads could be selected based on a user's prior activities rather than current browsing, but this approach calls for collecting and retaining ever more information about users' activities. Balancing these concerns-while satisfying users, advertisers, publishers, and various intermediaries-presents challenging questions at the intersection of economics, computer science, law, and public policy.
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Deceptive banner ads overstate the urgency of clicking through.
